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Abstract 
In a search for determinants of societal levels of income inequality, scholars have 
suggested that homogamy within marriages and cohabiting relationships is a potentially 
important driver of inequality. If resourceful persons form couples together, and 
individuals without resources partner each other too, inequality between households is 
expected to be higher compared to the situation where partnerships are formed across 
groups. Education is an important socioeconomic marker on which partners select each 
other. The results of this paper, however, show that changes over time in educational 
homogamy are unlikely to have contributed to changes in income inequality. This finding 
is based on counterfactual simulations performed for 21 European countries and the 
United States using data from the Luxembourg Income Studies.  
In a second stage of the analysis we examine why changes in educational assortative 
mating mattered relatively little for changes in income inequality. A major hypothesis 
proposed in earlier research is that changes in educational homogamy have not been 
large enough to affect income inequality. However, based on simulations where 
educational homogamy are minimized and maximized, we document that even extreme 
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changes in the association between partners’ levels of education would not lead to major 
increases in income inequality.  
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There are several ways available to people to gain access to income. Firstly, individuals 
can generate income through the labor market, investments, or by qualifying for welfare 
benefits. Secondly, individuals can find a partner and gain access to her or his income too 
(once income is shared). As a major route to income, partnering behavior is therefore 
likely to be a key source of income inequality between households. In this regard, 
socioeconomic homogamy within couples could be an important determinant of income 
inequality (Blossfeld, 2009; Schwartz, 2013). If resourceful individuals form couples 
together, and people without resources partner each other too, inequality between 
households is expected to be higher compared to the situation where partnerships are 
formed across those groups.  
Previous studies on a small set of countries have aimed to empirically test this argument 
by studying to what extent changes in income inequality can be accounted for by changes 
in sorting based on education, an important socioeconomic marker (i.e. Denmark, Breen 
and Andersen, 2012; Norway, Eika et al., 2014; the UK, Breen and Salazar, 2010; and the 
US, Breen and Salazar, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014). Surprisingly, 
these studies found that changes in educational homogamy have not been an important 
factor contributing to increases in income inequality between households over time 
(Breen and Salazar, 2010; 2011; Breen and Andersen, 2012). The first aim of this article 
is to investigate whether this conclusion can be generalized to more contexts by studying 
21 European countries and the United States. We use data from the Luxembourg Income 
Studies (LIS) to estimate the contribution of changes in educational homogamy
1
 to 
household income inequality across various decades (from the 1980s to 2010s, depending 
on the country). We find that changes in educational homogamy have had a negligible 
effect on changes in income inequality across the period studied.   
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Two main reasons have been proposed as to why changes in educational homogamy have 
been inconsequential for income inequality in the countries studied so far (Schwartz 
2013). Firstly, changes in educational homogamy might have been too small to affect 
income inequality. Secondly, the combined levels of education of partners could be a 
relatively poor predictor of household income, such that even major changes in 
educational homogamy remain relatively inconsequential for income inequality. The 
second aim of this paper is to test the validity of these hypotheses for the 22 countries 
under study. We perform sets of counterfactual simulations to quantify the possible 
effects of extreme changes in educational homogamy on income inequality between 
households. The results suggest that even extreme changes in educational homogamy 
would produce relatively small changes in income inequality. The predictive power of 
partners’ combined levels of education appears to explain too little variation in household 
income for educational homogamy to have a major impact on income inequality.  
 
Educational homogamy among partners and income inequality 
Research on the influence of partnering behavior on income inequality forms part of a 
larger literature documenting the role of family dynamics including family structure, 
female employment and the association between partners’ earnings (Bouchet-Valat, 
2017; Esping-Andersen, 2007; Kollmeyer, 2012; McLanahan and Percheski, 2008; 
Western et al., 2008). Among these factors, the influence of the correlation between 
partners’ earnings on income inequality appears especially large (Frémeaux and Lefranc, 
2015; Schwartz, 2013) and can explain between 20% and 50% of changes in income 
inequality over time in the United States (Schwartz, 2010). This observation provokes the 
question whether a range of family dynamics including the selection of partners and 
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processes that take place after union formation (e.g. the division of labor) matter for 
income inequality (Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz, 2017). In this article, we examine to 
what extent changing patterns of partner selection, referred to as assortative mating, can 
predict changes in income inequality. 
This question has been addressed in several earlier studies on the role of partner selection 
based on education, a major predictor of current and future income. Education is one of 
the major characteristics based on which individuals select their partners, and a 
concentration of education within couples is likely to translate into a concentration of 
income within couples too. Changes over time in educational homogamy could therefore 
be an important driver behind changes in income inequality. A set of recent studies has 
aimed to empirically verify this possibility for a handful of countries (i.e. for Denmark: 
Breen and Andersen, 2012; Norway: Eika et al., 2014; the UK: Breen and Salazar, 2010; 
and the US: Breen and Salazar, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014). The 
evidence so far, however, suggests that changes over time in educational homogamy have 
had a negligible effect on earnings or income inequality between households. Given the 
relatively limited geographical scope of these studies, the question arises to what extent 
this conclusion generalizes to other contexts or not. The first aim of this paper will be to 
verify this.  
Two main reasons have been offered to explain why, in the countries studied so far, 
educational homogamy had a negligible impact on income inequality (Schwarz, 2013). 
Firstly, changes in educational homogamy might not have been large enough to affect 
income inequality. There is quite some debate as to whether individuals have indeed 
become increasingly likely to partner someone similar to themselves in terms of 
education or not. For the US, some scholars have argued that educational homogamy 
increased (Schwartz and Mare, 2005) whereas Rosenfeld (2008) argued that it has 
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remained relatively stable over time. Trends in educational homogamy within European 
countries appear equally unclear (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003; Blossfeld, 2009), and a 
recent study even suggests that it has declined with time (De Hauw et al, 2017). If that is 
the case, the increases in income inequality over the last decades might have taken place 
despite decreases in educational homogamy.  
Secondly, it could be that changes in educational homogamy have been considerable but 
that the combined level of education of a couple is a relatively weak predictor of 
household income. If this is the case, even major changes in educational homogamy are 
unlikely to affect income inequality between households. Breen and Salazar (2011) 
addressed this issue for the United States by simulating whether extreme changes in 
homogamy could have affected earnings inequality within the context of the early 2000s. 
They estimated how high earnings inequality would be in the extreme cases of minimum 
and maximum possible educational homogamy, and concluded that, in both situations, 
earnings inequality would barely differ from the actual level of inequality observed for 
the early 2000s. Furthermore, they documented that educational homogamy within 
couples can only explain a small part of the correlation in earnings between partners. This 
would support the possibility that the combined level of education within a couple is a 
weak predictor of their household income.  
This finding, however, is at odds with what Eika and others (2014) as well as 
Harmenberg (2014) concluded for income inequality in the US based on similar methods. 
They documented that in the situation of minimal homogamy, income inequality would 
be slightly but non-negligibly lower than observed. The results for the United States thus 
remain inconclusive (possibly due to differences between earnings or income inequality). 
For other countries, evidence on the possible contribution of educational homogamy to 
inequality is entirely absent, with the exception of Norway (Eika et al., 2014) for which a 
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similar small contribution of educational homogamy to income inequality was 
documented.  
In short, recent research suggests that educational homogamy might not be such an 
important determinant of income inequality as previously thought. But, whether this 
conclusion is generally applicable across contexts is unknown. In addition, the reasons 
for this possible limited influence are still poorly understood (Schwartz, 2013). Our main 
research questions are therefore: Does the result of a limited influence of changes in 
educational homogamy on income inequality extend to a wide set of European countries? 
If so, is this because of a lack of changes in educational homogamy over time, or would 
even extreme changes in homogamy not affect income inequality? To what extent and 
why do answers to these questions differ across countries? 
 
Data and Measures 
We use data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) for 21 European countries that 
provide information for at least two time periods that are spaced 10 years apart or more.
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Given that most of the studies on the topic have been performed for the United States, we 
also include the US to increase the comparability of our results across studies. The LIS 
data are harmonized representative cross-sectional surveys that have been used in many 
key studies on income inequality (Milanovic, 2002; Solt, 2016). In order to maximize the 
time periods and countries covered, we take the first and last available dataset that met 
the requirements for our analysis.  
We look at inequality in equivalized disposable household income, instead of at earnings 
inequality, as we prioritize our interest in the overall consequences of educational 
homogamy for household income inequality (even though earnings might be more 
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directly connected to educational homogamy, Breen and Salazar, 2011). The most recent 
dataset for each country is selected, as well as the oldest dataset available that employed a 
comparable operationalization of disposable household income and education. Household 
income is equivalized using the square root of the number of household members. In 
addition, we use Purchasing Power Parity deflators to adjust all income variables to 2011 
levels expressed in US dollars.
3
 To stay in line with previous studies, we calculate 
inequality using the Theil-index (Breen and Salazar, 2012; Breen and Andersen, 2012) 
for individuals based on their equivalized disposable household income. Household 
sample weights are included in all analysis. 
To minimize the share of respondents still in education, we select households where the 
head was between 30 and 64 years old.
4 
We exclude same-sex couples (as part of our 
analysis is based on the relationship between men’s and women’s education within 
couples) as well as households with members who were not (natural/step/foster/adopted) 
children or partners of the head of household (as dynamics at play in such households 
could be very different and go beyond the scope of this paper).   
Table 1 displays the datasets used, as well as the sample sizes obtained after our 
restriction criteria are applied. The median sample size for each country-year is 4,563 and 
ranges from 798 for Hungary 1991 to 109,950 for Norway 2013. The sample sizes for 
Hungary are quite a bit smaller than the other samples, and its results should therefore be 
interpreted with care.   
Besides income, the other key variable of the analysis is education of the head of 
household and her or his partner. We use the harmonized education variable provided by 
LIS which divides education into three categories, namely, lower secondary or less 
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(ISCED 1-2), upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) or tertiary education (ISCED 5-6). Cases 
with missing information on education are retained in the analysis.  
-Table 1 - 
 
Procedure 
We commence our analysis by giving some indications of how the relationship between 
partners’ levels of education changed over time in the countries under study. To this end 
we report the association between partners’ educational levels using Kendall’s Tau-b, a 
measure designed to express the association between ordinal variables. We take both 
married and cohabiting partners into account as couples. Given that conclusions about 
whether educational homogamy has changed over time appear to depend highly on the 
method used (Blossfeld, 2009; Rosenfeld, 2008; Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz and Mare, 
2005), we also present results using an alternative measure, namely, the Odds Ratio for 
tertiary educated (ISCED 5-6) individuals to also have a partner with tertiary education 
(instead of having a partner with lower levels of education; see Rosenfeld, 2008).  
 
Changes in the association of partners’ education and inequality 
The first aim of our paper is to document whether changes in educational homogamy 
could have contributed to changes in income inequality over time. To this end, we 
classify households into different groups based on the education of the male and female 
partner within the couple (of which one is the head of household), as well as the age of 
the head of household. We also incorporate men and women who were single and assign 
the value ‘absent’ to their partner’s level of education; a separate value is also coded for 
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cases with missing information on education (Breen and Andersen, 2012). Both his and 
her education can therefore take on 5 values (ISCED 1-2; ISCED 3-4; ISCED 5-6; 
absent; missing). Combining his and her education for each household leads to 25 
categories of households. We subsequently divided all cells into two groups based on the 
age of the head of household (set at being 47 or younger, or 48 and older; 47 being the 
middle point between ages 30 and 64), leading to 50 groups of households in total.
5
  
Following the studies that set the standard (Breen and Salazar, 2010; 2011; Breen and 
Andersen, 2012) we subsequently express inequality T using the Theil-index, and 
specifically in the following form (Breen and Andersen, 2012): 
𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑙𝑛𝑗  (
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
) + ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑗
?̅?𝑗
∑ ?̅?𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑇𝑗    [1] 
Inequality in this form depends on three quantities: 𝑝𝑗 which is the share of households in 
each of the 50 categories defined above (indexed by j); ?̅?𝑗 which is the average household 
income in group j; and 𝑇𝑗 which is the inequality in income within group j, where:  
𝑇𝑗 =
1
𝑛𝑗
∑
𝑥𝑖|𝑗
?̅?𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1  𝑙𝑛 [
𝑥𝑖|𝑗
?̅?𝑗
].    [2] 
Here 𝑛𝑗  is the number of cases in group j and 𝑥𝑖|𝑗 the income of household i in group j. 
The first part of equation [1], ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑙𝑛𝑗  (
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
), is the part of household income 
inequality that is due to variation between groups of households (‘between-group 
inequality’) whereas the second part expresses variation within groups of households 
(‘within-group inequality’). Our main goal is to determine the impact that changes in 
assortative mating have had on changes in income inequality between two points in time 
(t1 and t2). By calculating 𝑝𝑗, ?̅?𝑗, and 𝑇𝑗 for each country and time period studied, 
‘counterfactual’ analysis can be performed where one or more of these statistics takes on 
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the values of another time period, while keeping the other statistics constant. For 
instance, using these quantities it would be possible to estimate what inequality in year t2 
would look like in the hypothetical situation where average earnings for each group ?̅?𝑗 
would have remained as observed in year t1, but 𝑝𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗 did take on the values observed 
in t2. By varying the statistic that is set at its t1 values, the contribution of the change in 
each of the three quantities to income inequality in t2 can be estimated.  
The counterfactual scenario where we set 𝑝𝑗 at the level of t1 but keep ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗 at their t2 
levels, estimates the influence of changes in the distribution of households across the 50 
education/family structure categories. This scenario therewith changes patterns of 
educational assortative mating, but these include changes in the likelihood to remain 
single and changes in average levels of education over time too. Given that we are 
interested in the effect of educational homogamy per se, we would ideally isolate the 
effect of changes in the association between partners’ levels of education from changes in 
levels of educational attainment and the likelihood of partnering. To this end, we further 
follow Breen and Salazar (2010; 2011) in their method based on the Deming-Stephan 
algorithm, where we adjust the t1 distribution 𝑝𝑗 of households across categories to match 
the t2 marginal distributions of women’s and men’s education, as well as the t2 
distribution of single households. In this manner, we obtain a 𝑝𝑗 that, once plugged into 
its t2 context (i.e. t2 levels of ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗), indicates the contribution of changes in the 
association between her and his education per se to income inequality in t2.
6
  
 
Simulations of income inequality if homogamy were minimal and maximal 
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The procedure discussed thus far will give an indication of the contribution of changes in 
the association between partners’ levels of education to changes over time in income 
inequality. Previous studies found a negligible role for such changes in educational 
homogamy, but the reasons why are still poorly understood. We examine one major 
possibility in the empirical part of this paper, namely, that changes in educational 
homogamy have not been large enough. To test whether changes in educational 
homogamy could lead to changes in income inequality, if only they were to be big 
enough, we estimate ‘counterfactual simulations’ of extreme changes in homogamy. 
Firstly, for each country and period we calculate a ‘counterfactual’ distribution of 
households for the hypothetical situation where men’s and women’s educations within 
couples are independent (see, for instance, Eika et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014), as well 
as a counterfactual distribution where the association between both is maximized given 
the marginal distributions of education in that given period (as applied by Breen and 
Salazar (2011) to the 2004 US distribution).  
To calculate the distribution of households for the situation where partners’ educations 
are independent, we first create 3x3 tables crossing her and his education (one-person 
households and households with missing levels of education were kept at original 
frequencies) for each age group (47- and 48+). We subsequently calculate the share of 
coupled men and women with a given level of education, and multiplied, for each cell of 
the 3x3 tables of households, the corresponding shares of men’s and women’s education. 
Plugging the resulting distribution of households into equation [1] will give an estimate 
of how high income inequality would be if couples in a given period and time would be 
formed at random.  
To calculate the distribution of households where the association between educations is 
maximized (but keeping the marginal distributions of education in the population 
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constant) we, again, first calculate the age-specific column and row totals for the 3x3 
tables that cross her and his education (also here we keep frequencies of singles and 
missing cases constant) in each period and country. Second, for each cell on the diagonal 
of the table (i.e. homogamous couples) we assign the lowest value between the 
corresponding row or column totals. Subsequently, there is only one possible way to 
complete the table, and assign frequencies to the other cells (Breen and Salazar, 2011). 
Contrasting the situation of minimum to maximum homogamy will inform us about the 
possible contribution homogamy could have on income inequality given the country and 
period’s context.  
An illustrative example: Spain in 2013 
We illustrate the simulations performed for each country and period by using a stylized 
example for Spain in 2013 (for households whose head is aged 47 or less). Table 2a 
displays the actual distribution of couples according to her and his education. In the first 
simulation, we aim to maintain the marginal educational distributions of the last period 
(2013 in Spain), but apply the pattern of assortative mating observed in the first period; in 
the case of Spain this is the year 1990. The procedure used to arrive at such a distribution 
is based on an iterative process where the frequencies in each cell observed in 1990 are 
adjusted to fit the column and row totals of 2013 (see Breen and Salazar, 2010; 2011). In 
this manner, the relative proportions across cells are maintained, which is the case when 
comparing the resulting distribution displayed in Table 2b to the distribution of 
households in 1990 (Table 2e).
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- Tables 2a-2e 
Our second counterfactual situation consists of simulating a situation where homogamy 
would be minimal given the country-period’s educational distributions. Table 2c displays 
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the result of this exercise for Spain 2013. The percentage displayed in each cell is 
obtained by multiplying the corresponding row total with the column total (expressed as 
proportions of 1) of Table 2a. This is the distribution one would expect if education 
would play no role in the partnering process and individuals would match randomly 
across the educational groups. As observed, the percentage of homogamous couples is 
lower in this simulation compared to the actual situation of Table 2a.  
Finally, the result of the simulated situation of maximal homogamy is displayed in Table 
2d. In this simulation the proportions of couples falling on the diagonal of the table (i.e. 
homogamous couples) are maximized. For each cell on the main diagonal, the minimum 
value between the column and row total of Table 2a is taken. Subsequently, the 
percentages in the other cells can only take on one possible value to maintain all row and 
column totals of Table 2a.  
The percentages of Tables 2b-2d are used to calculate a new pj for each type of 
household, and are subsequently joined with the pj values for single heads of households 
and those with missing values of education. Combining these simulated pj values with the 
observed values for ?̅?𝑗, and 𝑇𝑗 in 2013 in Spain will give simulated levels of income 
inequality.  
 
Results  
We start by describing changes over time in estimated income inequality as well as the 
association between partners’ educations across the 22 countries in Table 3. As by now 
well known, the general trend in terms of income inequality has been upward over the 
last decades. At the same time, there are a few exceptions to this trend, all in countries 
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with high initial levels of income inequality. Ireland shows the largest reduction in 
income inequality of 33.2% between 1994 and 2010. Several of the former communist 
countries show the largest increases in income inequality, but increases have been large 
in countries such as Austria, Luxembourg and Norway too.  
- Table 3 -  
The second panel of Table 3 displays trends across time in the association between 
partners’ levels of education. Somewhat unexpectedly, the associations between women’s 
and men’s levels of education within couples have in general declined. The clearest 
examples in this regard are Austria and the Netherlands. There are a couple of deviations 
from this overall trend, most notably France, Hungary and Luxembourg. Similarly, when 
zooming in on the top end of the distribution, the odds ratios of partnering a tertiary 
educated partner have gone down for individuals who are tertiary educated themselves. 
The observed declines in educational homogamy could be somewhat surprising, but 
appear in line with recent evidence on 28 European countries that homogamy decreased 
among both higher educated men and women (De Hauw et al., 2017), for an important 
part because women are increasingly more likely to ‘marry down’ (see also Esteve et al., 
2012; 2016). We return to this issue in the discussion. Given that decreasing associations 
between partners’ educational levels are predicted to lead to lower income inequality, 
decreasing educational homogamy might even have dampened increases in income 
inequality. Is this indeed the case?  
Table 4 reproduces the actual Theil-expressed levels of inequality for the last period 
observed for each country in the second column. The third column of the table displays 
the results of the counterfactual exercises as performed in earlier studies looking at the 
influence of changes in patterns of assortative mating on inequality (Breen and Salazar, 
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2011; Breen and Andersen, 2012). For this simulation, we changed the distribution of 
couples to the counterfactual situation where the pattern of educational assortative mating 
is as in the first year observed, but all else is kept at the levels of the last year (average 
income of each group, inequality within groups, singlehood, and educational levels in the 
population are kept constant). The fourth column expresses the percentage difference 
between the Theil’s of Column 2 and 3.  
It can be observed that simulated levels of inequality generally only change slightly in the 
counterfactual scenarios. The median difference across countries amounts to a 0.3% 
higher level of income inequality if educational homogamy would not have changed over 
time. The last column of Table 4 states the part of changes in income inequality over time 
that could be attributed to changes in educational homogamy. The median value across 
countries is in this case –0.5%. This reflects the pattern observed in several countries that 
income inequality increased despite an equalizing effect of changes in educational 
homogamy. In most of these countries this equalizing effect is very small, but it is 
slightly bigger in France and the Netherlands where income inequality was simulated to 
be 3.2 and 4.9 per cent higher, respectively, if homogamy would have remained equal 
across time.
8
 In general, however, the conclusion drawn in earlier studies holds that 
changes in educational homogamy are unlikely to have contributed in a major way to 
changes in income inequality. 
 
Could extreme changes in educational homogamy affect income inequality? 
A major hypothesis proposed in earlier studies is that changes in educational homogamy 
have been too small to have important effects on income inequality (and given the 
decreases in homogamy observed, whether larger decreases in homogamy would have 
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dampened income inequality to a more substantial extent). We test whether this is indeed 
the case for the 22 countries of this study by simulating income inequality changes when 
moving from the hypothetical situation of minimal educational homogamy to the 
hypothetical situation of maximum educational homogamy.  
Figures 1a-1c display the results of the simulations where educational homogamy would 
be at the minimum and at the maximum possible level. The lines in the graphs cover the 
range in income inequality covered by the simulations using data from the latest available 
years.
9
 These lines start from the data point simulated for minimal homogamy, they 
subsequently connect to the data point corresponding to actual observed levels (indicated 
with a dot), and end at the data point indicating income inequality for the simulated 
situation of maximum educational homogamy (indicated with a plus sign). The diagonal 
reference lines in the graph indicate overall levels of income inequality that correspond 
with the labels of the y-axis where they origin from (i.e. the level of within-group 
inequality when between-group inequality is zero). Moving from one diagonal line to 
another corresponds to a 0.01 change in income inequality.  
- Figures 1a-1c  
In general, the ranges of simulated income inequality do not cross more than two lines. 
The maximum range of simulated changes in overall income inequality therefore amounts 
to 0.024 in Italy (ranging from 0.190 under minimal homogamy to 0.214 for maximal 
homogamy). In some countries, such as Denmark and Hungary, this range is practically 
zero. On average across countries, overall income inequality increases with only 0.01 
when moving from minimal to maximal homogamy. In relative terms, income inequality 
is simulated to be 6.6% higher on average across countries in the scenario of maximal 
homogamy compared to the scenario of minimal homogamy. Ranges above 10% are 
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observed in Czech Republic (12.6%); Greece (11.2%); Italy (12.8%); Luxembourg 
(13.6%); The Netherlands (14.2%); and Slovenia (13.7%).
10
 Actual levels of income 
inequality are on average 4.2% higher than in the minimal homogamy scenario. In none 
of the countries does educational homogamy therefore seem to have the potential to have 
a great impact on income inequality. At the same time, in a subset of countries there 
appears to be a possible contribution of changes in educational homogamy to income 
inequality that could be labeled small to modest. This pattern of cross-national variation 
is addressed in additional analysis discussed later.  
Why is the influence of educational homogamy modest at most? The alternative 
hypothesis proposed in earlier research is that the combined level of partners’ educations 
is a relatively imprecise predictor of income inequality. Figures 1a-1c give insight into 
this possibility by breaking down each (simulated) level of inequality into a part that is 
due to income differences between groups of households, displayed on the x-axis, and a 
part that is due to income inequality within groups of households, displayed on the y-axis. 
Between-group inequality indicates the part of overall income inequality that can be 
attributed to differences in the combined levels of education between couples. In general, 
we would expect the simulations to affect between-group inequality as we re-distribute 
households across groups with different average levels of household income. Such 
changes in between-group inequality would result in horizontal lines in the graphs. The 
expectation is that more educational homogamy leads to more between-group inequality, 
as it implies more couples being placed in the categories with both the lowest and the 
highest average income (i.e. both partners low/high education respectively). If this is the 
case, these horizontal lines should run from left to right (with the plus sign, indicating 
maximum homogamy, expected to be on the right). The lines in Figures 1a-1c indeed 
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show that basically all lines run from left to right, indicating that between-group 
inequality increases with educational homogamy.  
Extreme changes in educational homogamy are thus simulated to affect the part of 
inequality that can be explained by differences in education between households, and the 
extent to which they do differs widely across countries. The smallest ranges are observed 
for Sweden and Austria where moving from minimal to maximal homogamy would only 
result in an increase in between-group inequality of 0.002. At the other end of the 
spectrum lies Spain where the contribution of between-group inequality increases from 
0.048 to 0.069, a 44% increase. Also in several other countries does between-group 
inequality show large relative increases, such as France (53%), Poland (46%), and Italy 
(43%). Across countries, the average (and median) increase in between-group inequality 
is 29% when moving from minimum to maximum homogamy. Actual observed levels of 
between-group inequality are on average 17% higher than the level simulated for the 
situation of minimal homogamy.  
Why then, do changes in educational homogamy have a limited influence on overall 
levels of income inequality? The answer lies in the share of overall inequality that can be 
attributed to between-group inequality (i.e. the share of inequality in income that is due to 
average income differences according to couples’ levels of education). Comparing the 
ranges of the y-axes to the ranges of the x-axes in Figures 1a-1c shows that within-group 
inequality (i.e. variation within groups of households with a given combined level of 
education) contributes much more to overall inequality than between-group inequality. 
More precisely, between-group inequality is responsible for between 13 and 35 per cent 
of overall inequality (the average being 23%), for the country-years of Figures 1a-1c. 
Given that changes in educational homogamy have no systematic influence on within-
group inequality (as confirmed by the unsystematic direction of vertical moves in Figures 
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1a-1c), even a hypothetical 50% increase in between-group inequality would only result 
in a 17.5% increase in overall income inequality in the most extreme of cases. The 
combined level of couples’ educations therefore simply appears to explain too little of 
variation in household income in order for educational homogamy changes to have a 
major impact on income inequality.  
Additional Analysis 
Even though a major influence of hypothetical extreme changes in educational 
homogamy on income inequality was not observed in any of the countries, extreme 
changes in homogamy would produce small to modest changes in income inequality in 
some cases. In additional analysis, described in the Online Appendix, we aim to explain 
why this is the case in some countries, but not others. This analysis showed that changes 
in educational homogamy are more likely to be related to changes in income inequality in 
countries with large average differences in household income between groups of couples 
defined by their education. In addition, and less obviously so, also the compression of the 
educational distribution matters. When educational distributions are very compressed 
(e.g. almost everyone has ISCED 3-4 education), there are very few possibilities to form 
large numbers of non-homogomous couples, which limits the possible impact of changes 
in homogamy on income inequality. It goes beyond the scope of the main text to go into 
further details, but more information is provided in the Online Appendix.  
 
Discussion 
Despite concerns that changes in homogamy within couples might have contributed to 
increased income inequality (Breen and Salazar, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2007; 
Schwartz, 2013; Western et al., 2008), most previous studies on the topic concluded that 
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changes in educational homogamy have had little impact on income inequality (Breen 
and Salazar, 2010; 2011; Breen and Andersen, 2012; Eika et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 
2014; Hryshko et al., 2015). In this article, we extended this finding to a wide set of 
European countries. Across countries, changes in educational homogamy in fact appeared 
related to a negligible decrease in income inequality, as educational homogamy seems to 
have declined over time in most countries. In a quest to explain these somewhat 
unexpected results, we found that also extreme changes in educational homogamy would 
at most have a small to modest impact on income inequality, and in many countries this 
effect would even be negligible.  
A major conclusion that can therefore be drawn from the results of this article is that 
possible concerns about large inequality amplifying effects of changes in educational 
homogamy appear to be unwarranted. The first reason, on which we concentrated in this 
article, is that even extreme changes in homogamy are expected to have at most a small to 
modest impact on income inequality. A second reason is that educational homogamy 
appeared to have declined over time in most countries. Given the relatively surprising 
nature of this latter finding and because documenting trends in educational homogamy 
per se was not our primary objective, these results will have to be confirmed in future 
research using more sophisticated measures of educational homogamy. At the same time, 
recent studies have also hinted at decreasing levels of homogamy (De Hauw et al., 2017).  
There are some limitations of this paper that should be discussed. Our cross-national 
approach led us to use a rather crude measure of education.
11 
It could be that in some 
countries we missed important divisions between educational groups due to this 
limitation. Future country-specific investigations could look at more detailed educational 
categories. In general, however, matching on education appears not to be the most 
relevant characteristic for income inequality. Earlier research on income inequality in 
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general has also concluded that inequality within groups, defined by their family structure 
and education, has been largely responsible for increases in household income inequality 
over time (Western et al., 2008). Future research is therefore likely to find more action 
when focusing on other factors, besides education, that could account for the increasing 
association in income between partners (Schwartz, 2013; but, see Grotti & Scherer, 
2016). A high association between partners’ incomes can be the result of a variety of 
processes, of which partner selection is only one. One process is the matching of partners 
based on their income generation potential (Frémeaux and Lefranc, 2015). A recent paper 
on the US, however, found no role for partner selection based on earnings once 
explaining changes in income inequality. Processes that take place after union formation, 
such as the division of labor, appeared more important (Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz, 
2017). Future research could investigate whether this conclusion also holds in other 
contexts.  
There is another important limitation of this study. The counterfactual simulations 
performed in the paper rely on several assumptions that might not be realistic. In the 
simulations, we assumed that as the relative proportions of households falling into a 
given group changes, the average household income of these groups remains equal (as 
well as its within-group variation). If there are systematic ways in which groups differ on 
unobserved characteristics that affect income, this assumption might not hold.  
To what extent would this affect conclusions? In certain countries, there appears little 
scope in general for conclusions to change, as the influence of educational homogamy on 
income inequality is dictated by educational distributions (and the limits it poses on the 
possibility to form non-homogamous unions, see the Online Appendix), rather than 
differences in average income between groups. But, more generally, we cannot claim that 
our results would not change if such unobserved factors would be accounted for. 
23 
 
However, it could be expected that if non-homogamous couples differ systematically 
from homogamous couples on unobserved traits affecting income, that non-homogamous 
couples are the more disadvantaged group (net of education). In non-homogamous 
couples at least one partner ‘married down’ in terms of education. This could reflect, on 
average, unobserved socioeconomic disadvantages if one assumes that having a higher 
educated partner is generally more desirable (or, instead, that having a homogamous 
partner is what people in generally look for). If this is the case, our simulations would 
over-estimate the possible influence of changes in educational homogamy on income 
inequality (as moving individuals from non-homogamous couples to homogamous 
categories would reduce average income in the homogamy categories). The conclusion of 
a generally limited influence of educational homogamy on income inequality would 
therefore find even more support.  
In conclusion, we therefore found no support for the hypothesis that partner selection 
based on education, an important socioeconomic marker, is an important determinant of 
income inequality between households. Future research can investigate whether this 
generalizes to partner selection in general and also once considering other inequalities 
including inequality of opportunity.  
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Notes.  
1 
We use the terms homogamy and assortative mating interchangeably, and refer to the 
extent to which individuals with given characteristics form unions together.
 
2 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (multiple 
countries; accessed 11/10/16 – 07/09/17). Luxembourg: LIS. 
3 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/data-access/ppp-deflators/
 
4 
In line with Breen and Salazar (2011) we exclude cases where the partner was younger 
than 18 years too, as well as couples where the male was 30 years older than his partner, 
or the female 25 years older than her partner.
 
5 
We divided the sample according to age to account to some extent for differences in 
household income by age, and to put some restrictions on who is expected to partner 
with whom in later analysis. The choice for dividing the sample into two groups is 
arbitrary, but driven by the nature of the analysis which does not allow for simply 
controlling for age and therefore necessitates choosing an arbitrary cut-off. In 
robustness checks (available upon request) we also ran the analysis for respondents aged 
47 or less only. The aim there was to zoom in on the ‘latest trends’ observed for the 
younger cohorts, and to monitor the possible influence of cohort differences in the role 
of educational homogamy. Our conclusions applied equally to this analysis limited to 
the younger age group, even though some minor variations were observed in some 
countries, see footnote 10.
 
6 
See the appendix to Breen and Salazar (2010) for more details. This method relies on 
maintaining the relative cell sizes between certain key categories of households at t1 
levels, while adjusting row and column totals of the 5x5 table to t2 levels through an 
iterative process.  
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7 
When running a poisson regression on the frequencies in each cell, using her and his 
education and their interaction as independent variables, the interaction effects display 
identical coefficients for both the distributions in Table 2b and Table 2e
 
8 
In two countries, Greece and Sweden, changes in educational homogamy were 
estimated to have had a small inequality amplifying effect, as simulated income 
inequality was 3.2 and 4.6 per cent lower in the counterfactual situation that educational 
homogamy would not have changed over time. In Sweden, this was primarily produced 
through an increase in the overall contribution of within-group inequality. This implies 
that the simulation moved households from groups with relatively high within-group 
inequality to groups with lower within-group inequality. In Sweden educational 
homogamy appeared to have changed little across the period studied (Table 3), and this 
therefore implies that changes in the specific pattern of educational assortative mating 
can also affect income inequality even if the overall association between partners’ levels 
of education is stable.
 
9 
Repeating the same counterfactual analysis for the (country specific) earliest available 
years leads to very similar results, and are therefore not reported here (but available upon 
request). 
10 
In robustness checks where only households with heads aged 47 or less were 
considered, the ranges for Poland (16.8%) and Slovakia (16.5%) were also relatively 
large.
 
11 
We ran a robustness check for the Germany, Norway, Spain and the United States 
using four or five educational categories and found very similar results (available upon 
request). This is a sub-selection of countries which had more detailed information on 
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education, which was comparable over time, and large sample sizes (required to fill 
each cell of the his*her education table).
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Table 1. Datasets used and final sample sizes  
Country n Country n 
Austria 1987 4,335 Italy 1989 4,791 
Austria 2004 2,675 Italy 2010 3,671 
Belgium 1985 3,712 Luxembourg 1991 1,004 
Belgium 1997 2,561 Luxembourg 2013 2,182 
Czech Rep. 1992 8,454 Netherlands 1983 2,628 
Czech Rep. 2013 3,559 Netherlands 2013 5,800 
Denmark 1987 5,610 Norway 1986 2,613 
Denmark 2010 40,167 Norway 2013 109,950 
Estonia 2000 2,753 Poland 1986 5,999 
Estonia 2010 2,107 Poland 2013 17,667 
Finland 1995 5,665 Slovakia 1992 8,119 
Finland 2013 6,317 Slovakia 2010 2,443 
France 1978 5,787 Slovenia 1997 1,377 
France 2010 5,236 Slovenia 2012 1,901 
Germany 1994 3,751 Spain 1990 10,896 
Germany 2013 8,210 Spain 2013 5,699 
Greece 1995 2,283 Sweden 1992 7,475 
Greece 2010 2,582 Sweden 2005 8,267 
Hungary 1991 827 UK 1999 11,792 
Hungary 2012 798 UK 2013 9,129 
Ireland 1994 1,760 US 1979 28,412 
Ireland 2010 1,956 US 2013 23,903 
   Note. n expresses final number of unweighted households used in the analysis 
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Tables 2a-2e. Actual and simulated distributions of households for Spain 2013 
Table 2a. Actual Distribution of Households across Household Types in Spain '13:   
 
 
 
Table 2b. Simulated Distribution of Households if Homogamy were as in Spain '90:   
 
 
 
Table 2c. Simulated Distribution of Households if Homogamy were Minimal:   
 
 
 
Table 2d. Simulated Distribution of Households if Homogamy were Maximal:   
 
 
 
Table 2e. Actual Distribution of Households across Household Types in Spain '90:   
 
 
 
Note. Distributions for households with heads aged 47 or less 
  
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 19.9% 9.1% 9.9% 39.0% 
Middle 5.0% 7.2% 10.4% 22.7% 
High 4.7% 4.8% 28.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 24.3% 7.0% 7.7% 39.0% 
Middle 3.5% 8.6% 10.6% 22.7% 
High 1.9% 5.6% 30.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 11.6% 8.3% 19.1% 39.0% 
Middle 6.7% 4.8% 11.1% 22.7% 
High 11.4% 8.1% 18.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 29.7% 0.0% 9.3% 39.0% 
Middle 0.0% 21.2% 1.5% 22.7% 
High 0.0% 0.0% 38.4% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 59.8% 4.2% 1.7% 65.6% 
Middle 8.2% 5.0% 2.2% 15.4% 
High 6.1% 4.4% 8.4% 19.0% 
Column Total 74.1% 13.7% 12.3% 100% 
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Table 3. Changes in income inequality and the association between partners’ educations 
Country First Year 
Theil 
Last Year  
Theil 
% Change  
in Theil 
First Year  
Tau-b 
Last Year 
Tau-b 
% Change 
Tau-b 
First year 
OR College  
Last year  
OR College 
Austria (‘87/’04) 0.084 0.127 51.2 0.531 0.400 -24.7 36.7 7.3 
Belgium (‘85/’97) 0.091 0.105 15.4 0.604 0.549 -9.1 17.5 11.7 
Czech Rep. (‘92/’13) 0.081 0.144 77.8 0.403 0.426 5.7 15.9 9.8 
Denmark (‘87/’10) 0.107 0.144 34.6 0.386 0.375 -2.9 8.3 5.8 
Estonia (‘00/’10) 0.266 0.205 -22.9 0.420 0.414 -1.4 7.0 7.2 
Finland (‘95/’13) 0.094 0.124 31.9 0.363 0.335 -7.7 5.7 4.4 
France (‘78/’10) 0.195 0.177 -9.7 0.364 0.454 24.7 18.4 10.0 
Germany (‘94/’13) 0.145 0.195 34.5 0.364 0.362 -0.5 5.5 5.3 
Greece (‘95/’10) 0.223 0.202 -9.3 0.626 0.589 -5.9 24.5 14.9 
Hungary (‘91/’12) 0.148 0.175 18.2 0.491 0.569 15.9 14.1 16.7 
Ireland (‘94/’10) 0.248 0.166 -33.1 0.508 0.531 4.5 10.1 10.0 
Italy (‘89/’10) 0.166 0.202 21.7 0.622 0.554 -10.9 26.0 19.3 
Luxembourg (‘91/’13) 0.106 0.151 42.5 0.397 0.597 50.4 18.6 18.4 
Netherlands (‘83/’13) 0.113 0.132 16.8 0.477 0.380 -20.3 34.9 5.3 
Norway (‘86/’13) 0.084 0.130 54.8 0.420 0.378 -10.0 9.5 6.0 
Poland (‘86/13) 0.118 0.234 98.3 0.585 0.553 -5.5 36.5 21.0 
Slovakia (‘92/’10) 0.074 0.134 81.1 0.542 0.472 -12.9 10.8 23.1 
Slovenia (‘97/’12) 0.097 0.163 68.0 0.512 0.450 -12.1 11.9 8.4 
Spain (‘90/’13) 0.187 0.222 18.7 0.551 0.441 -20.0 21.4 6.7 
Sweden (‘92/’05) 0.083 0.117 41.0 0.382 0.381 -0.3 7.4 6.0 
UK (‘99/’13)  0.270 0.228 -15.6 0.513 0.464 -9.6 11.8 7.2 
US (‘74/’13) 0.163 0.281 72.4 0.525 0.500 -4.8 10.8 7.7 
Note. Theil-expressed inequality in disposable household income between individuals. Years between brackets. Tau-b expresses association between partners’ educational 
levels. ‘OR college’ expresses the Odds Ratio of college educated men to be partnered with a college educated woman instead of a non-college educated woman (reference 
category non-college educated men) 
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Table 4. Part of changes in income inequality attributable to changes in educational 
homogamy  
Country Observed Theil 
last year 
Simulated Theil 
if homogamy 
were as first year 
% Difference 
between 
observed and 
simulated Theil 
% of Change in 
income inequality 
due to changes in 
homogamy 
Austria (‘87/’04) 0.127 0.127 0.1% -0.2% 
Belgium (‘85/’97) 0.105 0.104 -0.5% 3.9% 
Czech Rep. (‘92/’13) 0.144 0.144 0.2% -0.6% 
Denmark (‘87/’10) 0.144 0.146 1.4% -5.6% 
Estonia (‘00/’10) 0.206 0.205 -0.4% -1.4% 
Finland (‘95/’13) 0.125 0.125 0.4% -1.6% 
France (‘78/’10) 0.177 0.183 3.2% 33.1% 
Germany (‘94/’13) 0.194 0.197 1.5% -6.1% 
Greece (‘95/’10) 0.202 0.196 -3.2% -30.9% 
Hungary (‘91/’12) 0.176 0.175 -0.1% 0.9% 
Ireland (‘94/’10) 0.166 0.169 1.6% 3.2% 
Italy (‘89/’10) 0.202 0.203 0.4% -2.0% 
Luxembourg (‘91/’13) 0.151 0.150 -0.5% 1.8% 
Netherlands (‘83/’13) 0.132 0.139 4.9% -34.4% 
Norway (‘86/’13) 0.130 0.130 0.3% -0.9% 
Poland (‘86/13) 0.234 0.232 -0.7% 1.5% 
Slovakia (‘92/’10) 0.132 0.132 -0.3% 0.6% 
Slovenia (‘97/’12) 0.163 0.164 1.0% -2.4% 
Spain (‘90/’13) 0.222 0.225 1.6% -10.3% 
Sweden (‘92/’05) 0.117 0.112 -4.6% 15.7% 
UK (‘99/’13) 0.228 0.229 0.4% 2.4% 
US (‘74/’13) 0.282 0.282 0.1% -0.3% 
     
Median across countries  0.3% -0.5% 
Note. Column 2: Theil observed in last year as taken from Table 3. Column 3: Simulated Theil based on 
simulating the pattern of educational assortative mating in the first year but keeping the educational 
distributions of the last year, as done for the example in Table 2b. Column 4: is (Column 3-Column 2) / 
Column 2. Column 5: (Column2-Column3)/(Theil in last year – Theil in first year).  
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Figure  1a. Actual and simulated levels of income inequality if homogamy were 
minimal/maximal  
 
Note. For each country-period the graph indicates three data points: simulated income inequality if 
homogamy were minimal, actual inequality (indicated with a dot), and simulated inequality if homogamy 
were maximal (indicated with a plus sign). The lines run from the first scenario, through actual levels, to 
the scenario of maximum homogamy. Diagonal dotted lines indicate overall levels of inequality which 
correspond to the labels on the Y-axis at the lines’ origin.   
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Figure  1b. Actual and simulated levels of income inequality if homogamy were 
minimal/maximal 
 
Note. For each country-period the graph indicates three data points: simulated income inequality if 
homogamy were minimal, actual inequality (indicated with a dot), and simulated inequality if homogamy 
were maximal (indicated with a plus sign). The lines run from the first scenario, through actual levels, to 
the scenario of maximum homogamy. Diagonal dotted lines indicate overall levels of inequality which 
correspond to the labels on the Y-axis at the lines’ origin.   
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Figure  1c. Actual and simulated levels of income inequality if homogamy were 
minimal/maximal  
 
Note. For each country-period the graph indicates three data points: simulated income inequality if 
homogamy were minimal, actual inequality (indicated with a dot), and simulated inequality if homogamy 
were maximal (indicated with a plus sign). The lines run from the first scenario, through actual levels, to 
the scenario of maximum homogamy. Diagonal dotted lines indicate overall levels of inequality which 
correspond to the labels on the Y-axis at the lines’ origin.   
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Online Appendix A. Explaining cross-national variation in the negligible to small 
impact of extreme changes in educational homogamy on income inequality 
What are the factors that determine whether the contribution of hypothetical extreme 
changes in educational homogamy to income inequality is close to zero, or small to 
modest? There appear to be two candidates. Firstly, average differences in income 
between educational groups could be small. Re-distributing households across groups 
defined by their education will then have little impact on income inequality. A second 
factor could be the structural constraints that marginal educational distributions put on re-
distributing households across different groups. For instance, in countries where the great 
majority of both the male and female population is lower educated, there is only a limited 
amount of higher educated individuals available with whom non-homogamous 
partnerships can be formed. In other words, the impact of re-distributing households 
across educational groups depends on the amount of households that are moved, as well 
as the average change in income variation associated with each move.  
In the additional analysis presented here, we focus on between-group inequality as we 
have clear expectations on how between-group inequality behaves depending on changes 
in homogamy. In addition, the contribution of educational homogamy to overall income 
inequality is to a great extent explained by the relative contribution of between-group 
inequality to total income inequality (results not shown here but available upon request).  
In Figure A1, the x-axis displays the coefficient of variation for the observed values of ?̅?𝑗  
for each country (the 18 average levels of income for couples according to his and her 
education, as well as age), in other words, how much income averages vary across 
couple-types according to their combined levels of education. The y-axis indicates the 
percentage change in between-group inequality when moving from minimum to 
maximum educational homogamy (see Figures 1a-1c). Probably not very surprisingly, a 
clear positive relationship between both can be observed, indicating that the greater the 
variation in average incomes across groups, the stronger the influence of educational 
homogamy. The correlation between both is 0.42 (it increases to 0.59 when excluding 
Hungary, a very low N case). Whereas it is not surprising that there is a correlation, there 
appears to be room for additional explanations.  
Figure A2 displays on the x-axis the share of households that would move to a different 
group j if homogamy would change from minimal to maximal (i.e. an indicator of the 
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amount of moves across groups of households). This share of households that would 
move is a little below 20% in Germany and amounts up to 45% in Greece. This scope for 
the re-distribution of couples is positively correlated to the influence of homogamy on 
income inequality, and even more so than the variation in average income across groups: 
0.50. This suggests that also the number of households that can possibly be non-
homogomous affects the possible influence of educational homogamy on between-group 
inequality.  
In some cases, the limited scope for re-distributing households across groups appears to 
offer an explanation for why changes in homogamy have a smaller than expected 
influence on inequality (e.g. Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Estonia and Germany, based on 
Figure A1). Some countries had a higher than expected influence of changes in 
homogamy, possibly due to relatively high possibilities for distribution of households 
across groups (e.g. France, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain). 
When inspecting the educational distributions by sex for each country and age group (not 
shown) it appeared that there are very few individuals with lower education (ISCED 1-2) 
in countries with a small scope for re-distributing cases across groups of households (e.g. 
Germany, Czech Republic and Estonia). On top of that, the size of higher educated 
individuals (ISCED 5-6) is relatively small in these countries. In the most extreme case, 
Germany, the majority of individuals has middle levels of education (ISCED 3-4). In 
Germany, there are therefore simply not many higher and especially lower educated 
individuals available that allow for creating a large number of non-homogamous couples. 
At the other extreme, there are countries that have more or less equal shares of 
individuals in each educational group, maximizing the scope for forming non-
homogamous partnerships.   
When combining the predictive power of the variation in average income across groups, 
and the scope for formation of non-homogomous couples, about 42% of total variation 
gets explained. This goes up to 53% of total variation when the outlier Hungary is 
disregarded (additional analysis, not shown). Remaining variation is likely due to 
particularities of the distribution of average income across groups of households (e.g. 
particularly low income for a certain group of households, for instance, higher educated 
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women partnered with lower educated men; another possibility consists of large 
differences in average income across age groups).
1
  
  
                                                          
1
 Even though the findings shown in Figures A1 and A2 are based on the latest available data for each 
country, the results do not change substantially when using surveys from earlier periods (not shown). 
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Figure A1. Variation in average levels of household income across educational 
groups and the change in between-group inequality when moving from minimal to 
maximal homogamy using the latest available data. 
Figure A2. Share of household heads changing educational category and the change 
in between-group inequality when moving from minimal to maximal homogamy 
using the latest available data. 
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